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Amtrak: Budget and Reauthorization
SUMMARY
Amtrak was created by Congress in 1970
to provide intercity passenger railroad service.
It operates approximately 44 routes over
22,000 miles of track, 97% of which is owned
by freight rail companies.  It runs a deficit
each year, and requires federal assistance to
cover operating losses and capital investment.
Without a yearly federal grant to cover operat-
ing losses, Amtrak would not survive as
presently configured.  The crux of the public
policy issue facing Congress has been suc-
cinctly stated by Kenneth Mead, the
Department of Transportation Inspector Gen-
eral (DOT IG): “The mismatch between the
public resources made available to fund inter-
city passenger rail service, the total cost of
maintaining the system that Amtrak continues
to operate, and proposals to restructure the
system comprise the dysfunction that must be
resolved in the reauthorization process of the
nation’s intercity passenger rail system.” 
During the 107th and 108th Congresses,
Amtrak policy was stalemated and no consen-
sus could be reached on what kind of passen-
ger rail system to fund.  Congress failed to
endorse Amtrak’s strategy of maintaining its
full current network while restoring its infra-
structure to a state of good repair.  In the 109th
Congress, the Administration and Amtrak
have both presented proposals for “reform.”
Appropriations.  The Administration’s
FY2006 Budget requests no funding for
Amtrak: “With no subsidies, Amtrak would
quickly enter bankruptcy, which would likely
lead to the elimination of inefficient opera-
tions and the reorganization of the railroad
through bankruptcy procedures.”  In a letter to
Amtrak employees, Amtrak president David
Gunn stated “the [Administration] proposal is
irresponsible and a surprising disappoint-
ment.” Secretary of Transportation Mineta has
since suggested that,  with reform, the Admin-
istration will be willing to provide some as yet
unspecified higher level of funding.
Amtrak requested $1.82 billion in federal
assistance for FY2006, and emphasized that it
cannot continue to operate at the $1.2 billion
current level of funding.  The DOT IG has
said that Amtrak needs $1.4 billion for
FY2006. The House version of H.R. 3058
would provide $1.2 billion for Amtrak for
FY2006; the Senate Committee on Appropria-
tions has recommended $1.45 billion. 
Reauthorization.  Amtrak’s authoriza-
tion expired in December 2002.
Reauthorization issues in the 109th Congress
include Amtrak’s funding level, the size of its
network, the introduction of competition for
routes, and Amtrak restructuring.  On April
14, 2005, the Bush Administration sent its
Amtrak restructuring proposal, the Passenger
Rail Investment Reform Act (introduced as
H.R. 1713), to Congress. On April 27, 2005,
the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure approved an Amtrak
reauthorization bill (H.R. 1630) that provides
$2 billion a year to Amtrak for FY2006-08. 
That bill does not include provisions to re-
structure Amtrak. 
On July 28, 2005, the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
marked up S. 1516 to authorize Amtrak for
FYFY2006-FY2011.  The bill would provide
an average of $1.9 billion annually.  It would
not restructure Amtrak, but would impose
standards for performance.  The bill would
also authorize the issuance of $13 billion in




On July 28, 2005, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
considered and reported S. 1516 to the Senate to reauthorize Amtrak for six years (FY2006-
2011).  The bill would authorize $11.4 billion in appropriations for Amtrak, and would
authorize the issuance of $13 billion in federal bonds to finance additional capital
improvements.
On July 22, 2005, the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended a $1.45
billion appropriation for Amtrak in their markup of H.R. 3058, the FY2006 appropriations
bill for the Department of Transportation (and other federal agencies).  On June 30, the
House approved H.R. 3058 with an amendment that increased Amtrak’s FY2006
appropriation to $1.176 billion from the $550 million recommended by the House
Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 109-153).  The Administration had requested no
funding for Amtrak for FY2006.
On April 27, 2005, the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
considered and reported a bill to the House to reauthorize Amtrak through FY2008 (H.R.
1630).  The Amtrak Reauthorization Act of 2005 would authorize appropriations of $2
billion per year for FY2006-2008 for Amtrak. H.R. 1630 would not restructure Amtrak.
On April 21, 2005, Amtrak presented a set of strategic reform initiatives that differs
significantly from the Administration’s proposal.  Amtrak’s proposal calls on the federal
government  to eliminate Amtrak’s $3.5 billion debt burden, provide funding for railway
labor costs that result from discontinuing routes or restructuring, develop passenger rail
corridors based on an 80-20 federal-state capital matching program, and bring the Northeast
Corridor (NEC) into a good state of repair; Amtrak would continue to operate the Northeast
Corridor and there would be no separation of operations and infrastructure in the Corridor.
At the same time, Amtrak requested $1.82 billion for FY2006. 
On April 15, 2005, Amtrak’s fleet of troubled Acela trains was pulled from service on
the Northeast Corridor after Federal Railroad Administration inspectors found cracked brake
rotors on the passenger cars.  Amtrak’s supplier and the builder of the train, Bombardier, did
not have enough replacement rotors in stock and, as a result, the trains will not be operating
until new rotors can be manufactured.  As of July 29, 2005, a few trains have been returned
to service.  In 2002, Acela locomotives were found to have cracks and service was suspended
until repairs could be made.  In 1999, the introduction of the Acela was delayed a year due
to mechanical problems.
On April 13, 2005, the Administration submitted the Passenger Rail Reform Act to
Congress.  Introduced by request as H.R. 1713, the bill proposes a significant restructuring
of passenger rail service in the United States and is similar to legislation introduced in the
108th Congress.  It would transition Amtrak to a pure operating company, establish a multi-
state compact to manage all rail operations in the Northeast Corridor, provide for a phased
reduction of operating subsidies to Amtrak’s 15 long-distance routes, and establish a
permanent Federal program of grant assistance for capital projects for infrastructure
investments in rail.  
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On February 7, 2005, the President presented his budget proposal to Congress.  The
proposal contained no funding for Amtrak, and stated that without subsidies, Amtrak would
quickly enter bankruptcy, thus hastening its reorganization.  The Administration requested
$360 million for the Surface Transportation Board to support the operation of commuter
trains on the Northeast Corridor in the event Amtrak ceases operations.  This appears to be
intended to preempt a complete closure of commuter rail traffic on the Northeast Corridor
should Amtrak suddenly shut its system down.
On November 18, 2004, the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General (DOT
IG) issued a report noting that Congress has not bought into Amtrak’s strategy of maintaining
the current system size, and warning that Amtrak’s postponement of needed maintenance
increases the risk of a serious accident on its network.  On April 21, 2005, the DOT IG
reiterated his warning, stating that “the limp-along status quo system comes closer to a major
failure, but no one knows where or when such a failure may occur.”1
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Amtrak — officially, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation — is the nation’s
only provider of intercity passenger rail service.  Amtrak is structured as a private company,
but virtually all its shares are held by the United States Department of Transportation (DOT).
Amtrak was created by Congress in 1970 to maintain a minimum level of intercity passenger
rail service, while relieving the railroad companies of the financial burden of providing that
money-losing service. Although created as a for-profit corporation, Amtrak, like intercity
passenger rail operators in other countries, has not been able to make a profit.  During the last
35 years, federal assistance to Amtrak has amounted to approximately $29 billion.2
Amtrak’s approximately 20,000 employees operate trains and maintain its
infrastructure.  The company operates approximately 44 routes over 22,000 miles of track.
More than 97% of that track is owned by freight rail companies; Amtrak owns about 730
route miles of track.3  The section it owns — the Northeast Corridor (NEC) — includes some
of the most heavily used segments of track in the nation. Amtrak “is distinctly a minority user
on certain portions of the NEC. By far, the greatest volume of NEC traffic is represented by”
commuter and freight trains.4  Amtrak operates corridor routes (covering distances under 400
miles) and long-distance routes (over 400 miles in length).  Some of Amtrak’s corridor routes
are supported in part by assistance from the states they serve.  Amtrak also operates
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commuter service under contract with state and local commuter authorities in various parts
of the country.
The Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-134; 111 Stat. 2570)
authorized Amtrak for the period December 1997 through December 2002.  It required that
Amtrak operate without federal operating assistance after 2002; this was not accomplished.
During the period leading up to this operational self-sufficiency deadline, Amtrak’s then-
president, George Warrington, repeatedly assured Congress that Amtrak was on a ‘glide-
path’ to profitability.  However, in FY2002 Amtrak proved to be in worse financial shape
than in 1997, and Amtrak’s debt increased from $1.7 billion in 1997 to $4.8 billion in 2002.
Warrington resigned in April 2002. 
In May 2002, David Gunn took over as Amtrak’s new president.  In June 2002, Mr.
Gunn and the Amtrak Board announced that Amtrak’s was in danger of running out of
money and that the railroad faced an imminent shutdown if Amtrak did not receive $200
million to keep the company operating through September 2002.  After tense negotiations,
the Department of Transportation provided a $100 million loan and Congress approved a
$100 million grant to Amtrak.5
Although Amtrak’s FY2005-2009 Strategic Plan calls for more than $8 billion in federal
assistance over five years, Congress has thus far declined to provide the requested funding.
Amtrak’s annual appropriation has been $1.2 billion since FY2003, enough to keep the
system operating, but not enough to prevent the deferral of some significant maintenance
projects.  Although short of the funding required to accomplish Amtrak’s strategic vision,
Amtrak has resisted reorganizing the system and, according to the DOT IG, “it appears that
Amtrak’s management plans to continue operating the status quo system.”6  The DOT IG has
stated that a new federal intercity passenger rail strategy is needed.7  More fundamentally,
the DOT IG characterizes the public policy conundrum in the following way: “The mismatch
between the public resources made available to fund intercity passenger rail service, the total
cost of maintaining the system that Amtrak continues to operate, and proposals to restructure
the system comprise the dysfunction that must be resolved in the reauthorization process of
the nation’s intercity passenger rail system.”8
In the 2005 Annual Report to Congress, David Laney, Chairman of the Amtrak board
of directors, noted that 
Prospects for America’s intercity passenger rail service have reached a critical
crossroads. At current funding levels, existing operations and capital
investment will have to be severely curtailed or discontinued beyond FY2005;
conversely, without meaningful reform Amtrak cannot reasonably expect to
attract levels of funding from any combination of federal, state, local, or
IB10147 08-01-05
9 Laney, David M.  Testimony.  Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine.  April 21, 2005. p. 1.
10 Ibid., p. 9.
11 Robert Cohen, High-speed Train Woes Put Amtrak in a Bind,” New Jersey Star-Ledger, June 29,
2005.
12 Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Letter to David L. Gunn, President,
National Railroad Passenger Corporation [Amtrak], May 25, 2005.
13 118 Stat. 3220.
CRS-4
private sources at levels adequate and predictable enough to sustain passenger
rail service in this country.9
In April 2005, Mr. Laney again warned that Amtrak “cannot continue to operate at
Amtrak’s current funding level of $1.2 billion significantly, if at all, beyond FY2005.10  That
testimony came less than a week after Amtrak removed its Acela trains from service due to
cracked brake disks.  The train’s manufacturer (Bombardier) and subcontractors, Amtrak,
and the FRA are seeking the cause of the cracking and a solution to the problem.  In the
meantime, although Amtrak has replaced most of the scheduled Acela service in the
Washington D.C. to New York segment with other trains, the number of routes offered from
New York to Boston has been significantly reduced.  Between reduced ridership and lower
fares, Amtrak says it is losing $1 million a week in revenue attributable to the absence of the
Acela trains.11  The Acela trains have been out of service for eleven weeks as of the end of
June, and are not expected to fully return to service until perhaps September.
In May 2005, Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta wrote to Amtrak President
David Gunn “strongly” recommending that Amtrak “begin to implement cost-cutting
measures ... in a manner that does not jeopardize safety.”12  Mineta also objected to Gunn’s
characterization of Amtrak’s financial situation in testimony before a Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee.  Gunn had testified that Amtrak would end FY2005 with about $20 million
in cash on hand.  Mineta noted that Gunn’s estimate assumed the transfer to Amtrak of  $60
million which, pursuant to Congressional direction in P.L. 108-447 (the FY2005
Consolidated Appropriations Act), is being held in reserve by the DOT lest Amtrak cease
operations during FY2005.13  Those reserve funds would be used for directed operations to
continue commuter rail services that depend on Amtrak, in the event that Amtrak ceases
operations.  Without such a transfer before the end of FY2005, both Secretary Mineta and
Amtrak President Gunn have indicated that Amtrak will run out of money before the end of
the fiscal year, precipitating a crisis in passenger rail service and requiring that the $60
million be used for continuity of commuter operations.
Federal Oversight of Amtrak
In response to Amtrak’s inaccurate descriptions of its financial condition between 1998
and 2002, Congress has included provisions in Amtrak’s recent appropriations, beginning
in FY2003 (P.L. 108-7; 117 STAT. 11), intended to bring greater transparency to Amtrak’s
finances and to increase DOT’s control over Amtrak’s use of its appropriation.  Amtrak is
required to submit a Strategic Plan to Congress, updated annually, and is prohibited from
making expenditures not programmed in the Strategic Plan without advance notice to
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Congress.  Amtrak is also required to submit a monthly financial statement to Congress.
Also, Congress changed the way Amtrak receives its funding; the funding no longer goes
directly to Amtrak, but is allocated to the Secretary of Transportation, who makes quarterly
grants to Amtrak.  Amtrak is required to submit grant applications to DOT for each route to
receive this funding.
Finances
Amtrak runs a deficit of over a billion dollars each year.  Since 2001, Amtrak’s annual
operating losses have exceeded $1 billion and annual cash losses have exceeded $600
million.14  Capital depreciation (not a cash loss, but the estimated cost of repairing the wear
and tear to equipment and infrastructure) expenses amount to approximately $600 million
annually, most of which is incurred on the Northeast Corridor.  A third significant expense
is debt service (principal and interest payments on Amtrak’s accumulated debt is forecast to
be $278 million in 2006), which will amount to nearly $300 million annually for the
foreseeable future.15
Virtually all Amtrak’s 44 or so routes lose money.  According to the DOT IG, “in 2004,
long-distance trains cumulatively incurred operating losses of more than $600 million
(excluding interest  and depreciation).”16  By his calculation, eliminating long-distance
service will reduce operating losses by about $300 million, far too little to make Amtrak
profitable.  In congressional testimony, the DOT IG stated that long distance trains accounted
for only 15% of total intercity rail ridership and that 77% of long-distance train passengers
traveled along only portions of the routes, not end-to-end trips. Trips mostly ranged from
500-700 miles, slightly longer than corridor trips.17  In a recent report, the IG asserted that
Amtrak could save $150-$240 million annually by eliminating sleeper car service from its
long-distance trains, providing coach service only on those routes.18
Only Amtrak’s signature ‘high-speed’ service on the Northeast Corridor, the Acela, and
its companion Metroliner service, consistently earn more than their operating costs.
However, the annual maintenance cost of the Northeast Corridor dwarfs the operating profit
generated by Acela and Metroliner service.  Because the Acela was taken out of service on
April 15, 2005, after cracks were found in disc brakes on the axles of passenger cars, Amtrak
has estimated that it would lose $1 million a week while the Acela trains were out of service.
Amtrak began returning Acelas to service July 11, putting two trains back in service just shy
of three months after the Acelas were taken out of service.19  The trains are being returned
to service as they are refitted with new brake rotors.
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In addition to its annual deficit, Amtrak has major liabilities due to deferred
maintenance and accumulated debt.  Lacking money to complete all its capital repair and
maintenance projects, Amtrak has deferred many maintenance projects.  This has led the
DOT IG to observe that Amtrak’s continued deferral of maintenance increases the risk of a
major failure on its system.  Amtrak has an estimated $6 billion in backlogged capital
maintenance needs.20  These include replacement of aging bridges, signal equipment, and
catenary (the power source for the Northeast Corridor trains), improvements to tunnels and
track, repair of wrecked equipment, and overhaul of aging equipment.  The IG’s report
criticizes some of the capital spending choices Amtrak has made, such as refurbishing
sleeper cars instead of replacing aging bridges.  Amtrak’s president, David Gunn, in a
October 4, 2004 letter to the DOT IG, wrote: “Management agrees with a number of
conclusions reached in your report....  Deferred capital investment has reached critical levels
and continued deferral brings Amtrak closer to a major failure somewhere in the system.  We
are playing Russian roulette.”21
The Amtrak Reform Council and the DOT IG have both estimated that Amtrak requires
around $1.5 - $2 billion in federal operating and capital support annually.22  This is a higher
level of federal funding than Amtrak has ever consistently received.  In FY1998 and FY1999
Amtrak received around $1.7 billion annually in federal assistance, through a combination
of appropriations and an exceptional one-time funding provision of $2.3 billion (divided
equally between FY1998 and FY1999) in the Taxpayers Relief Act of 1997.23
In recent years Amtrak has stopped borrowing, trimmed its workforce, and cut its
expenses, while at the same time achieving increases in ridership.  However, the cuts in
expenses have been  small relative to Amtrak’s annual deficit, and increases in ridership have
been relatively modest as well.  In this context, the DOT IG has observed that Amtrak cannot
“save its way to financial health.”24
Amtrak’s internal options for significantly reducing its annual deficit in the short term
are limited.  As noted, its two major cost categories are the operating losses of the long-
distance trains and maintenance costs of the Northeast Corridor.  Reducing the size of its
system could, in the long run, significantly reduce Amtrak’s deficit and the long-run cost to
the Federal Government, although Amtrak would still run a short-term deficit even if it
eliminated all its long-distance trains, because of severance payments to employees.
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Additionally, the costs of maintaining the Northeast Corridor would remain, whatever the
fate of long-distance service.  Amtrak interprets 49 U.S.C. 24701 to require it to provide
service nationwide, which it takes to mean service that spans the nation, rather than service
in different parts of the nation.  Thus, Amtrak is unlikely to eliminate or restructure long-
distance routes without explicit direction from Congress.  Many Members of Congress
continue to support a nationwide Amtrak network.
Nor can Amtrak increase its revenues enough to eliminate its deficits.  Although
Amtrak’s ridership has grown slightly over the past few years, Amtrak’s level of service and
on-time performance have declined, due at least in part to the postponement of maintenance
work.  On-time performance declined from 74.1% in FY2003 to 70.7% in FY2004.  More
significantly, while Amtrak ridership increased in FY2003 and again in FY2004, its total
passenger and non-passenger revenues declined each year.  (FY2003: ridership up 2.7% to
24 million, revenues down by 10% or $230 million; FY2004: ridership up by 4.3%  to 25
million passengers, revenues declined by 7.8% or $161 million).25  Thus, increases in
ridership are not guaranteed to increase revenue and, in all likelihood, a sustained rise in the
number of Amtrak riders would require a significant increase in Amtrak’s level of service
and on-time performance, which would require significant increases in funding.
Appropriations
The President’s FY2006 budget proposal requests no money for Amtrak: “With no
subsidies, Amtrak would quickly enter bankruptcy, which would likely lead to the
elimination of inefficient operations and the reorganization of the railroad through
bankruptcy proceedings.”26 It is not at all clear what the outcome of an Amtrak bankruptcy
proceeding would be, except that the outcome would be determined by the courts rather than
by Congress or the Administration.27
The DOT IG has testified that “the bankruptcy option would be an extraordinarily
complex and risky undertaking — ...one not to be relied upon if the objective is to promote
a more rational and reliable national passenger rail system.”28  The Administration did not
request any funding for Amtrak for FY2006.  It requested $360 million for the Surface
Transportation Board to support commuter rail services that depend on Amtrak, in the event
that Amtrak ceases operations during FY2006.  The Administration’s proposal received
bipartisan criticism in both the House and the Senate. 
Amtrak submitted a request to Congress for $1.82 billion for FY2006. Amtrak’s
estimated operating and capital needs are $560 million and $787 million, respectively, or
$1.347 billion for FY2006.  In addition to operating and capital grants, Amtrak also
requested $278 million for debt service, $20 million for restructuring (this expense is
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associated with Amtrak’s Strategic Reform Initiatives), and a $175 million one-time infusion
of working capital to manage cash flow.  The key elements of this request are shown in
Table 1.
Table 1. Amtrak’s FY2006 Federal Funding Request
($ millions)
Business Line FY2006 Grant Request
Infrastructure management 479
NEC operations (28)
State corridor operations 166
National long-distance service 537
Ancillary businesses (61)
System support and security 254
Business Lines Total 1,347
Debt Service Payment 278
Restructuring Costs  20
Working capital 175
Total Federal Grant 1,820
Figures in parentheses represent income attributable to the business line and reduce the overall funding request.
Source: Amtrak, Strategic Reform Initiatives and FY06 Grant Request, pp. 37-42.
 In its report on the FY2006 Budget Resolution, the House Committee on the Budget
encouraged the House to continue funding Amtrak.29  The House Committee on
Appropriations recommended $550 million for grants to Amtrak for FY2006 when it marked
up H.R. 3058, the FY2006 appropriations bill for the Department of Transportation and other
federal agencies.  The Committee also established a standard for measuring the performance
of Amtrak’s individual routes.  Routes with a federal subsidy greater than $30 per passenger,
based on fully allocated costs per route, excluding depreciation and interest on debt, would
no longer be eligible for federal support.  This would have eliminated federal funding for
Amtrak’s long-distance routes and a few of its corridor routes, terminating service to 23
states.
Amtrak’s President, David Gunn, noting that Amtrak would owe its employees $1.4
billion over three years in severance payments if the long-distance trains were eliminated,30
asserted the Committee’s recommended funding would lead to an Amtrak shutdown, because
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the company could not meet debt service, pay its obligations to the railroad retirement fund
and make required payments to the workers it would have to lay off. 31
In its consideration of H.R. 3058, the House approved two amendments overturning the
recommendations of the Committee on Appropriations concerning Amtrak.  One
amendment, agreed to by voice vote, increased Amtrak’s FY2006 appropriation from $550
million to $1.176 billion.  This is $31 million less than the $1.207 Amtrak is receiving in
FY2005 (after the 0.83% across-the-board rescission), and significantly less than the $1.4
billion the DOT IG testified Amtrak needed in FY2006.  But it is $276 million more than the
House approved for Amtrak when it passed the FY2005 appropriations bill for transportation
(108th Congress: H.R. 5025).  The second amendment, approved by the House 269-152,
eliminated the provision prohibiting federal assistance for Amtrak routes requiring a per-
passenger subsidy of $30 or more.
The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $1.45 billion for Amtrak in its
markup of H.R. 3058 on July 22, 2005.  The Committee also provided that, beginning six
months after enactment of the appropriations bill, Amtrak would not be allowed to subsidize
the costs of its food and beverage services, or its sleeper car services32 and that Amtrak
should develop a new accounting system that can identify the average and marginal costs of
providing services on Amtrak’s routes.  The Committee also included provisions allowing
Amtrak to raise additional revenue by assessing a passenger service fee on all its tickets and
a maintenance fee on the commuter rail operations that use the Northeast Corridor.
Amtrak Reauthorization
Amtrak’s previous authorization expired in December 2002.  Since then, reauthorization
of Amtrak has been stalled by disagreement over the future of U.S. passenger rail policy.
Although numerous bills were introduced in the 107th and 108th Congresses and various
approaches have been advanced, Congress has thus far been unwilling either to provide
Amtrak with the level of funding that it has requested or to require an Amtrak restructuring
that would be consistent with the level of funding that Congress has been willing to provide.
Since 2002, Congress has essentially reached a stalemate with respect to Amtrak.  During the
107th and 108th Congresses, it was unable to reauthorize Amtrak or to reach a consensus on
what kind of passenger rail system it would be willing to fund.  It failed to endorse Amtrak’s
strategy of maintaining its full current network while restoring its infrastructure to a state of
good repair or to provide the funding that would have allowed that strategy to be executed
by Amtrak. 
As Congress once again considers Amtrak reauthorization, the range of options for
passenger rail include (1) providing higher levels of funding to support an expanded
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passenger rail system; (2) providing funding for operating and maintaining the current
system; (3) focusing available resources on providing service only to those corridors that can
be justified on economic grounds; (4) reducing Amtrak funding and eliminating much of the
present passenger rail network; (5) eliminating funding for Amtrak and reorganizing
passenger rail service in the United States.  Although various combinations of the above
options are possible, the DOT IG has concluded that the ‘status quo’ option is unsustainable
and that federal funding for Amtrak of between $1.4 billion and $1.5 billion would be
necessary to prevent cuts in service, but “would not be sufficient to move the system to a
state-of-good-repair, let alone permit investment in new corridor development.”  The DOT
IG notes that “Congress and the Administration have a very difficult decision to make in
determining the appropriate level of funding for intercity passenger rail.”33  In his own
analysis, he suggests that the level of Federal funding necessary for passenger rail service
should rise from a suggested level of  $1.6 billion in FY2006 to an annual level of $2.0
billion in FY2010 and beyond.34
In April 2005, three very different reauthorization proposals were put forward by the
Bush Administration, Amtrak, and the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure.
On April 27, 2005, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee reported out
a reauthorization bill, the Amtrak Reauthorization Act of 2005 (H.R. 1630), that would
provide $2 billion per year for FY2006-2008, with funds set aside for retirement and
commuter rail obligations.  The bill does not propose Amtrak restructuring, but according
to Committee Chairman Don Young, it “will allow Amtrak to continue with critical work
under its current five-year plan.”35
The Bush Administration proposal, the Passenger Rail Investment Reform Act (H.R.
1713), would restructure Amtrak, splitting it into three functionally independent entities: (1)
a corporate entity that would oversee Amtrak restructuring and manage residual
responsibilities, including specifically Amtrak’s legal right of access to other railroads; (2)
a pure passenger rail operating company; and (3) an infrastructure management company.
The bill also provides for the establishment of an interstate compact that will operate the
Northeast Corridor.  Members of the compact include all of the states and the District of
Columbia that constitute the NEC.  The proposal also gives states greater decision-making
authority with respect to provision of rail service and capital improvements; it also requires
a state matching contribution (of 50%) for capital projects that qualify under planning and
other criteria for federal assistance.  The bill also phases out operating subsidies for long-
distance trains, opens routes to competition, and authorizes buyouts for current employees.
The Administration bill calls for an annual appropriation of “such sums as necessary” to
accomplish the reforms specified in the bill.  The Administration proposal (H.R. 1713) has
been referred to the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.  
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The Amtrak proposal outlines a series of initiatives that would leave Amtrak as a single
integrated entity.  Unlike the Administration proposal, the Northeast Corridor infrastructure
would not be split from operations.  Amtrak has also proposed state matching contributions
for capital projects, but unlike the Administration’s 50/50 match, Amtrak recommends a state
match of 20%, with a federal contribution making up the remaining 80%. In terms of long-
distance routes, Amtrak “continues to believe that these trains play a valuable role, including
[1] serving as a foundation of a future rail development program; [2] forming the basis for,
and connections to, emerging state-supported corridors; and [3] providing an important
transportation link for many under-served rural communities and regions across the
country.”36  To achieve this, Amtrak is requesting continuing “limited” federal operating and
equipment support.  Amtrak’s initiative also includes a pilot project on one state-supported
route by 2007.  Amtrak has stated that it “would cooperate fully in providing any requested
services — but those services would be provided on a full cost basis consistent with any
future competitive environment for rail services.”37 Amtrak has also requested “labor
flexibility,” which would require all intercity passenger rail operators be subject to the same
labor law; allow Amtrak’s labor contracts to terminate at expiration; and transition all new
intercity passenger rail employees out of the Railroad Retirement system into Social Security,
with a possible 401(k) option. Amtrak has also requested federal funding for debt service
payments or the elimination of Amtrak’s debt burden. Amtrak has requested $1.82 billion
for FY2006, but has not yet disclosed the amounts that it will seek in future years.
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine, the DOT IG also addressed
the subject of reauthorization.  Specifically, he recommended that reauthorization “should
focus on improving mobility in short distance corridors around the country — not just in the
Northeast Corridor — and in restructuring long-distance services to complement corridor
services.”38  He also stated that this will entail creating “new relationships or partnerships
between the Federal Government and the states and among the states, Amtrak, and the freight
railroads.”39  He concurred with the Administration in recommending that states be given
much greater authority and control over intercity passenger rail decisions and recommended
that competition in passenger rail service be considered as part of reauthorization.  In
significant disagreement with the Administration’s proposal to split rail operations and the
Northeast Corridor infrastructure, the DOT IG also stated that he believes that such a
proposal is “too premature.”40
With respect to funding, the DOT IG recommended that the Federal funding levels will
need to grow from $1.6 billion in FY2006 to $2 billion per year in FY2010 and beyond.  This
includes operating and capital subsidies that decline from $570 million in FY2006 to $374
million in FY2010 to an annual grant of $337 million thereafter.  Using the DOT IG’s budget
construct, about $500 million will be available to the states to match for new or improved
corridor development when Federal funding levels reach $2 billion; and once a “state-of-
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good-repair” is attained for the system as a whole, Federal funding for state capital matches
will amount to $1.3 billion per year.  He has also suggested that a “reasonable” state match
for capital projects should range from 15 to 30 percent.  To restore the NEC infrastructure
to a state-of-good-repair will require a federal commitment of $575 million per year between
FY2006-2010.  The DOT IG has also recommended that policymakers consider paying off
Amtrak’s legacy debt and restricting Amtrak’s ability to incur long-term debt.
Amtrak Legislation
On April 13, 2005, the Bush Administration sent a bill to Congress that would
significantly restructure passenger rail service in the United States.  Introduced on April 20,
2005 as H.R. 1713, by request, the Passenger Rail Reform Act was referred to the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
On April 27, 2005, the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
considered and reported a bill to the House to reauthorize Amtrak through FY2008 (H.R.
1630).  The Amtrak Reauthorization Act of 2005 would authorize appropriations of $2
billion per year for FY2006-2008 for Amtrak. H.R. 1630 would not restructure Amtrak.  The
bill is similar to legislation introduced in the 108th Congress (108th: H.R. 2572) that was
reported out of committee but saw no further action.
On July 28, 2005, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
considered and reported S. 1516 to the Senate to reauthorize Amtrak for six years (FY2006-
FY2011).  The bill would authorize $11.4 billion in appropriations for Amtrak, and would
authorize the issuance of $13 billion in federal bonds to finance additional capital
improvements.  The bill would reduce Amtrak’s federal operating support by 40% over the
life of the bill, while increasing its level of capital support.  Other provisions would require
Amtrak to evaluate and improve the performance of its long-distance routes, allow the
Surface Transportation Board to levy fines against freight railroads for failing to give Amtrak
trains their statutorily-required scheduling priority on freight railroad tracks.
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